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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALICE B. RING,

Plaintiff a1ul Appellant)
vs.

1

\V ALLACE H. RING,

Case No. 12961

\

Defendarnt aJnd Respondent)
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a post-divorce proceeding whereilJl the defendant (husband) petitioned the Court to eliminate his
obligation to pay alimony and to provide for specific
times and places for visita1tion rights with h~s children.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Jffoceedings below resulted in the entry of certain
Orders affecting the Divorce Decree. On .May 22, 1972~
tlw Court ordered:
1. That the Divorce Decree be modified to provide
that in addition to reasonable rights of visitation that
1

defendant should have the three children of the parties
with him for a period of one month during summer school
vacation which could be extended to two months on request of the children, and that the children spemd one
week of the Christmas vacation with their father including Christmas Day every other year.
2. That the provision for alimony in the Divorce
Decree be modified to reduce the same from $600.00 per
month to $1.00 per year.

3. That child support be increased to $125.00 per
month per child. (Although the child support issue was
not raised in the Court below, the increase, in child support was suggested by the Trial Court and voluntarily
accepted by the defendant).
On the 4th day of August, 1972, the Lower Court
further modified the Divorce Decree by providing that
the provision relaitive to Federal and State income tax
exemptions should be eliminated from the Decree.
RELI:IDF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant asks that the Order relati1ng to visitation
and alimony be reversed. Respondent has cross appealed
seeking reversal of the Order relating to the elimination
of the Provision of the Decree relatirng to the Federal and
State tax exemptions.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Resporndent does not fully accept the Statement of
Facts set forth by appellant and there.fore deems it
necessary to further refeir to the Record in support of the
Order of the Lower Court.
'rhe parties were divorced by a Decree of the District Court of Salt Lake County, entered September 19,
1968 (R. 24). It became final January 4, 1969. The Decree provided among other things that custody of the
three children of the parties was awarded to the plaintiff (appellarnt) subject to defendants (respondent) reasonable visitation rights. 'Dhe children of the parties are:
Rebecca, age 15; Eric, age 12; and Mark, age 9%.
Appellant was awarded the family home at 2996
Sequoia Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and in addition was
awarded $600.00 per month alimony and $300.00 pe r
month child support which reduced to $200.00 per month
in February of 1969.
1

There have been significant changes in the situation of appellant since the entry of the Decree. These
changes of circumstances were the motivating factors in
the eonmwncement of these post-divorce proceedings.
As we explore these factors iit is well to discuss certain
facts existing at and near the time of the divorce. Both
appellant and respondent are medical doctors -respondent is a specialist in the field of pediatric anestliPsiology a1nd practices almost exclusively at the Primar~· Childn·n's Hospital in Salt Lake City, Ftah. During
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the marriage of the parties and particularly in the last
period of time before the parties were divorced, appellant
had not actively practiced her profession but had chosen
rather to engage in activities other than the practice
of medicine and she had practiced only on a part-time
basis. Her last Income Tax Return prior to the entry of
the Decree of Divorce was for the calendar year 1967, and
it showed a gross income of $6,996.68 (Ex. 2). Although
appellant had expressed a preference for the medical
field of Public Health, nonetheless at the time of tihe
divorce she was not specialized in that field. After the
divorce with the assistamee of the Utah State Department
of Health, together with a Federal stipend, appellant
voluntarily elected to further pursue her career and
training and is now qualified as a specialist in the field
of Public Health. (R. 90). In 1971, appellant was offered a permanent and "challenging position" with the
United States Government in a Department of Health,
Education and \Velfare. Her headquarters are in San
Francisco, California, and she has chosen to permanently
resride in the State of California and is now residing at
El Cerr:Uto, California.
The position now held by appellant is a high le;vel,
administrative positioo requiring that she supervise
several Western States including Bawa.ii. The ~alary
she receives is commensurate with the demand of the
position. As shown on Exhibit 1-D her annual base
salary is $25,620.00 per year.
This salary is entirely adequate for the support of
4

appellanit. Testimony is explicit on this point..

Q.

Now, as far as you personally are concerned,
you are able to support yourself, adequately,
are you not, on your salary?

A.

Yes.

(R.107).

In addition to the dramatic increase in annellant's
earnings, there have beein additional economic changes
since the divorce.
The plaintiff now leases the real property sh~ reeeived in the Divorce Decree and she receives net, $100.00
per month. (R. 104).
She received property of the approximate value of
$30,000.00 from hf'r father's estate. (R. 103).
At the time of the divorce appellant was undergoing
exteinsive psychotherapy and for the tax year prior to the
<livoree, claimed approximately $3,500.00 in medical expense for this item. (Exhibit 5-D). This substantial item
of medical expense \Yas entirely eliminated shortly after
the divorce. (R. 101).
With rental income of $100.00 per month; potential
interest of at least $100.00 per month om the inheritance
and a reduction of medical expense of approximately
$300.00 iier month, the appellant has had an increase in
monthly ea11rnings of about $2,000.00 per month.
Another incidental fact that should be mentioned is
that when the children were residing here in Salt Lake
Cit>', Utah, they were attendirng Rowland Hall and it was
5

expensive for appellant to maintain them in that private
school. They are now attending public schools in the
State of California. (R. 158).
A factor also to be considered is that appellant is
well ple1ased with her position with the United States
Government - intends to stay with it and as time goes
by, she will earn more money. (R. 94-95).
Appellant is a woman with extensive training and
professional competence. She contributes much to society
and does so by choice. For this, she receives compensation at a level achieved only by a very few in our society.
To say at this time that appellant strunds in need of
alimony from her former husband is to distort the meaning of that term beyond legal comprehension.

By testimony and also statements i1n the Brief of
appellant, it is clear that the primary purpose of appellant coming to the State of Utah for the purpose of
these post-divorce proceedings was to contest respondent's Petition for a well-defined right of visitation with
his children.

It is a fact, amply demonstrated by the testimony and
conduct of appellant, that she does not ·want respondent
to have any meaningful association with his children.
Appellant, however, is far too ~ntelligent and cunning to
sav
. this in so manv. words, but the fact, and it is fart.
is amply demonstrated by this Record.

6

ARGUMEN'l'
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MODIFYING
THE CUSTODY PROVISION OF THE DECREE.

If further clarification of the attitude of appellant
toward the children and her desire to keep them from
all contact with the father is needed, it is clearly set forth
in Point I of appellant's Brief.
Here she states quite clearly that she does not want
the children two months of the year, in a "different home,
in a different city, under the supervision of a person
whose attitude and concepts of right conduct are a srtrong
variance from appellants." (Appellant's Brief, Page 4.)
8he obviously deeply resents the fact that the father of
these children should have anything to do with their
can• and upbringing and reserves to herself the superpower of being the only person capable of giving these
children the love, guidance, and concepts of right conduct. It also shows her deep antipathy for the respondent, else why should she in every way attempt to deprive
him of one of the che,rished things in life, and that is the
love and associM:io1n of the children.
Respondent has a deep love and affection for his
children and it is well at this point that we e:immine
his attitude and desires ilJl this rt-gard.
Q.

. .. When did they go to California 1

A.

They moved to California in September of
'70.

7

Q.

Now, in your own words, Doctor, I want vou
to tell 1the court the nature of the relation;hip
you have enjoyed with your children 1

A.

Well, I thi!nk it has been a rather excellent
one. Matter of fact, I believe it to be remarkable. I have a very fond affection; I love the
three of them, very much; and I feel very
confident that they love me, very, very mucl~ .
.A!t every opportunity that we have had to
be together, we have enjoyed it. They have
been very good about writing to me, regularly,
since they moved to California; aind I think
that the relationship has been what I would
call a very wholesome one.

1

Q.

Now, I want you to tell the court how you
would like this visitation matter handled in
the future, and why1

A.

I would like the opportunity to have the children with me for a block of time - a period
of time - I really don.'t think that it is wise
to try to be a father to the children on sort
of a week-end basis.
Of course, if I had my real rathers, I vYonld
rather have them, full-time, but I appreciate
that that isn't the wav it can be done; but I
would like to have an ~pportnnity to be a real
father to them; and I don't really think this
is possible on whe1re I just see the children
for verv short visits amd with the' - as longas the~ were in the city - it was not thait
difficu'lt because I conld, at least, have them
at my house over a week-end, and so forth;
take them on trips, and that kind of thing-.
But with the separation, it is extremely difficult to maintain a real relationship with the

8

children that iH of subHtamce of father-child
relationship.
~ d_on't want the kind of relationship where
it is sort of popcorn-candy-games, fun. I
want a relationship where I am "Daddy."
They know, do something wrong, they' get
paddled; they know that, nnw, and I am not
trying to say - I don't want to leave the
impression, I am some sort of a cruel father
because they really do respond to me - '
respect me and love me; know I am fair.
I do1J1't see how I can have that relationship! think children need their father - le,t me
put it that way; and I love my children and
I want to fulfill that need for them; but I
don't see how I can adequately fulfill that
need unless I cain be what a father ought to
be. (R. 109-110 and 111).

At the time the parties entered into their written
Stipulation that resulted in the Divorce Decree, respondent had reason to be concerned about the future whereabouts of his childrelJl. Appellant is not a native Utahn
and has no real ties, familial or otherwise, for this State,
and hence, there is a provision in the property settlement
Stipulation entered into by the parties, which reads as
follows:
"5. Neither party shall take the children out
of the jurisdiction of this court except upon the
approval of the other part>· in writing or upon
order of this court." (R.17).
Although rt:his provision of the Stipulation did not get
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce, it is, nonetheless,
binding on tlw parties. It beam the signatnrP of each.
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As indicated above, appellant elected to take the
children to the State of California in the fall of 1970
'
while she pursued her residency in the field of public
medicine. She did not, at that time, nor has she at any
time since, secured the agreement of respandent or the
permission of the Utah Court to do this. Admittedly,
when she first went to California, she intended to return
after her formal residency requirements were completed
a year later. There is a question whether under these
circumstances it would be necessary to secure approval.
However, some time during the summer of 1971, she
sought and received the position spoken of above with
the United States Government and voluntarily elected
to leave this jurisdiction permanently.
Significruntly, appellant did not advise respondent
of the fact that she would not return to the State of
Utah until after the children were in school. Thereafter
appellant made no effort whatever to afford to respondent an opportunity to visit with his children OIJl, a reasonable basis.
The evidence then shows that approximately two
weeks prior to the hearing on this matter in April, 1972,
respondent had visited his children in California and
was told by them that their plans for the summer had
already been made.
Q.

Well, what are tht> nature of the "pressnrPs"
that you feel might be exerted upon them?

A. Mr. Allen, I have never, in the entire tinw I
have known my children, had them. for any
10

reason, refuse to come to mv house or come
to this event because of anything in the way;
but, two weeks ago, when I visited with them
they all told me they had plans alroodv mad~
for this summer. (R.119).
·
What we see operating here is the very subtle but
persuasive "pressure" of the parent having custody
of the children.
During the hearimg in the Court below on the question
of visitation by the father, appellant was equivocal
whether she thought it reasonable that the children spend
time in the summer. It finally appeared that appellant
would be willing that the children spend two months
in the summer with their father providing:
( l)

th~~

children wanted to ; and

( 2) that they were cared for (R. 161).
She would not give the children an absolute veto over
whether they should visit with their father, but, nonetheless, she felt that if they had other plans, they should
not have to visit with their father. Her masoning is
subtly designed to win the approval of the Court. But
Pxperienced Judges know that the parent with primary
custody can always, and frequently does, construct plans
and events that effectivelv exclude the other parent. Thus
ronfronted, the Court wisely entered an Order which was
not conditional, and provided that respondent should
han' thP children visit with him in Salt Lake City, Utah,
for a one month period during the snnnne-r vacation which
11

could be extended to two months if the children so elected
in writing.
AppeUant became aware of the decision of the Court
about the 14th day of May, 1972, but attempted to further
frustrate the respondent in his desire to visit with his
children by stating that she had no intentio;n of allowing
the children to visit with their father until matters were
finally settled and dete1rmined by the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah.
This fact was set forth to the Court in a Petition
(R. 44) and it became necessary for the Court on June
13, 1972, to enter a specific Order providing for re spondent's visitation rights at specific times. Fortunately the
final attempt of appellant to frustrate the visitation
rights of respondent was torted by the Court.
1

As so frequently happens in these cases, appellant
and respondent find it impossible to communicate and it
becomes necessay for a Court to spell out certain rights
and obligations. We do, however, say to appellant at this
time, that it is not the iintention of respondent to bludgeon
either her or the children with a visitation Order. Respondent does not, however, want to be confronted each
summer with plans already made that make it impossible
for the children to be with him. He merely wants to be
cOlnsulted when the plans arE> made so that he can be
with the children for at ]east on<' month at a time when it
is convenient to all parties.
Appellant goes on to infPr in Point I of Argument
that the parent with mere visitation rights should exer-
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c1se no fundamental influence on the childre111 and that
respondent has demonstrated little desire in the past
for companionship with his children and that the Record
does not reveal a change in circumstances justifying the
Court in taking the children fr,om their mother for months
each year.
Appellant the111 concedes that the children may require both masculine and feminine influences and that a
father may need and deserve the companionship and
affectio111 of his children. However, appellant says that
these arguments should be made at the time of the divorce
proceedings and that once the Decree has been entered it
should be final.
The argument of appellant overlooks both well established law and statutory pronouncements i111 this State
and two fundamental matters in the divorce and the
divorce proceedings.
The Lower Court fonnd in its Findiing of Fact 15
(R 40) as follows :
"The fact that the children are now residing- some
distance from the place of residence of the defendant has made it dificult for the defendant to
exercise his rights of visitation. The defemdant
shows that he loves his children and desires to
give to them guidance, affection and ~iscipline,
and that this cannot be reasonably achieved unless the children are with him for an extended
period of time. It is rp,asona?le that each of ~he
ehildren spend one month durmg the summer with
the defendant and shall he entitled to spend hvo
months with their father if the~· so elect and signi-
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fy their intention in writing. Additionally, the
defendant shall have a right to have thE) children
with him for one week during their Christmas
school vacation and every other vear sueh visitat~on shall include Christmas Day. These specific
rights of the defendant shall be in addition to defendant's right of reasonable Yisitation with the
ehildren. ri1 he defendant is to bear the transportation costs."
This Finding of the Court was not objected to by
appellant except that she objected that this specific visitation right should be in addition to other rights of visitation. The court heard the objections and concluded onlY
that re,spondent should not make unreasonable demands
upon the appellant for other times of visitation. Appellant did not challenge the Finding below that the fact that
the children now reside some distance from Salt Lake City
makes it difficult to exercise his right of visitation and
appellant does not challenge the Finding that respondent
shows that he loves his children and desires to give
them guidance and affection. Even though, as this Court
said in King vs. King, 25 Ut. 2d 163; 478 Pac. 2d, 492,
that divorce proceedings are in equity and the Supreme
Court could review both questions of law and fact, nonetheless, where a Finding is made by the LmveT Court and
unchallenged, the Court should be most reluctant to disturb that Finding on Appeal.
The Court is also reminded that the parties agreed
at the time of the divorce that if the children were removed permanently from the State of Utah, that appellant
would secure a further agreement with respondent or
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obtain leave of Court. Appellant did, through her counsel, advise respondent that she was not returning to the
State of Utah but she did nothing further to honor her
commitment. She simply ignored the whole situation
until she was brought to Court on the Petitron of respondent.
The positi0111 taken by appellant it seems is that since
she was awarded custody initially it makes no difference
as to where she chooses to live and what effect this had
on respondent's right of visitation because the Decree
was final and cannot be changed. The law is, of course,
to the contrary. The principle of change is embodied in
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annofated, 1953, which states:
"Disposition of property and children: When a
decree of divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property
and parties, and the maintena:nce of the parties
and children, as may be equitable. The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custodv of the children and their support and maintena~ce, or the distribution of the property as shall
be reasonable and necessary."
In a case occurring a number of years ago, our Court
announced a broad principle relative to the matter of
split custody. In the case of H olma;n vs. Holman, ..... .
Ut. ...... , 77 Pac. 2d, 329 (1938) the Court stated:
"In this case the divorce carried $15 a month
alimony and support money for the ?hild. He ~s
fond of the child and craves her soc1et.'·· She is
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now. nearly 6 ye~rs of age, old enough to spend a
po~10n of her t_1me, whein her schooling ·will not
be mterfered \v1th, in the society of her father.
In case a divorce is properly granted and no good
reason appears for denying the father cnstodv of
a child for a portion of the year, the decree sh~nld
provide for a period of such custody, and the
means of coinveying her to the father if slw is
living a distance from him."
In Smith vs. Smith, 9 Ut. 2d 157, 340 Pac. 2d 419,
our Court had occasion to consider a split custody award.
The Court did reverse the decision for further proceedings in the Lower Court but indicated that nothing in
the Record suggests that the children would be treated
differently by either spouse a:nd pointed out further that
it was reluctant to upset the Decree in that regard, but
directed the Lower Court to take a further look at the
surroundings of the children for the three months in
question and reminded the Lower Court that the children
were of tender ye•ars and that such split custody might
not be so confusing to the children when they were older.
The Court will note that the children are older. (The
youngest is 10 years.)
The Utah case of Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Ut. 2d 73,
202 Pac. 2d, 550, was a post-divorce proceeding. The
parties had lived toge.ther in California until the wife
decided to remarry amd went to Nevada to get a divorce.
She was awarded cutody of their 3 year old son in the
divorce proceeding. She then moved to Utah. In Utah
Courts the father sought partial custody of his son. A
psychiatrist testified on behalf of the father that it would
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be to the best interest of the child to be with the father
for a portion of each year. Another psychiatrist testified
that it would be to the best interest of the child to remain
eointinnously in the mother's home. The Trial Court gave
the father cntody during June, July and August of each
year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Order upon the
ground that there was no showing in the Record that the
Lower Court had committed error in awarding custody
to the father for June, July, amd August of each year.

17

POINT II.
THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE MATERIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF APPELLANT WAS A COMPELLING
REASON FOR REDUCTION OF ALIMONY.

'!'his Court has often stated (the principle is recognized by appellant in her Brief), that in the event the
circumstances of the parties change after the divmce,
the Court has the power to modify the Decree. This
principle is embodied :Un the Code provision cited above,
30-3-5, UCA, 1953. Appellant in her Brief has chosen
to ignore this principle and instead has asked the Court
to apply the doctrine of Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Ut. 2d 79,
296 Pac. 2d 977, which case sets forth certairn factors such
as the duration of the marriage; the age of the parties;
their social position; health; children; the property they
have and how it was acquired; their earning capabilities
and earning potential.
Appellant argues further that it was contemplated
at the time of the divorce that appellant would work full
time as a general practitioner: would reasonably earn
$32,000.00 a year, and that the sum of alimony awarded
would be in addition to those earnirngs, and since her
earnings have not reached that point, alimony should not
be reduced.
The position of appellrunt is factually and legally
untenable. The doctrine of the "\Vilson case has application only at the time the divorce is granted. The elements
set forth in the Wilsorn case have meaning for the Lower
Court only when the Court initially fixes the amount of

18

stqiport. The correct principle applicable on a modifiration proceeding was announced by our Court in Sorenson vs. Sorenso11, 20 Ut. 2d 3G4, 438 Pac. 2d 180 (Utah).
"Our statute permits subsequent changes wh_ich
are reasonable and proper. This has bee111 construed to empower the Court to make a modification where there has been a substantial change in
the material circumstances of either one or both of
the parties since the decree was entered."
The Lower Court in this case correctly applied the
p6ncipal by thoroughly scrutinizing the Petition of respondent for modification and quantitatively analyzing
the snhstantial changes in the material circumstances of
appellant. The Court below sets for,th these chainges in
specific Findings of Fact (R. 37-41).
Citing the case of Allen v. Allen, 25 Ut. 2d 87, 475
Pae. 2d 1021, appellant states that the parties contemplatPd she would have a substantial income as a general
practitioner of medicine at the time of the divorce, and,
thcwpfore, the fact that her income has drarnafa~.ally
increased is no ground for a reduction of alimony because
tlrn money she now earns is not as much as she would
<'arn as a general 11ractitioner. The Record does not
snpport appellant's factual analysis. There is no evidence slmwing that appellant was a general practitioner.
A ppe11ant has never maintarned an office or treated
1mtiPnts. Tlwn• is no evidence that appellant was a mPmlwr of the hospital staff. These are some of the indicia of
thP gc>nPral practice of mPdicine and they are absent in
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this case. Reference is made to Page 90 of the Record
starting at Line 7:

Q.

Did you have a speciRlty in 1968 when this
divorce decree was entered 1

A.

I had had no formal residerncY - specialh
training, no.
·
·

Q.

Would you be classified as a general praC'titioner, at that time, then?

A.

I would simply be classified as a Doctor of
Medicine, I believe.

The fact is that appellant during the marriage had
never worked other tham part-time and the work that she
had during the marriage was always in the field of Public
Health. It is also abundantly clear from the Re0ord that
appellant at the time of the divorce did not contemplate
that she would work full time. In the Divorce Complaint
filed by appellant (R-2) she states:
"The condition of plairntiff's he·alth is now and for
many months past has been sueh that she requires
intensive and expensive medical care."
She used this strategem to obtain alimony at the time
of the divorce. The intensive amd expensive medical care
to which she refers is psychiatric care which in the year
1967 amounted to approximatel)r $4,000.00. Under these
circumstances it is not possible that the parties contemplated that appellant would work part-time. The only
inference from the Reeord is that appellant would co111tinue to have intensive and expensive medical care and
that her health "-ould not permit her to work. Interesting-
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l~·, at the hearing on the Modification Petition appellant
testified that at about the time the divorce was granted,
or shortly thereafter, she discontinued the psychotherapy
and has not had such treatment since that time. (R-101).

the testimony of appellant at the modification hearing shows that there was no understanding as
to how much time appellant would devote to work at the
time of the divorce.
:B~inally,

Q.

Dr. Ring, at the time the divorce decree was
entered, you didn't then have any intention
of pursuing full-time work, did you·?

A.

I certainly had the intention of pursuing
work. I knew I must. I was not sure, exactly
whether it would be full-time or near fulltime ; I really had no - my mind was not
made up.

WP ref er now to the Findings of the Lower Court
(R. 37) and the transcript where the substallltial changes

in the material circumstances of appellant are set forth.
rrhe gross income of appellant in 1967, (the year just
prior to the divorce) '.Vas $6,996.00. This was for parttinw work with the Utah State Department of Health.
Prior to that year appellant had only practiced part-time
and ahrn~·s in the field of Public Health. Subsequent to
the divor<'e, appellant complete-cl a medical speciality
in tlw field of Public Health and now earns $25,620.00
per vPar as a Public Health Administrator with the
F'Pde.ral Government and expects periodic increases in
pa~v

in the future.
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Appellant received the family home in Salt Lake
City as part of the Divorce Decree. This represented the
only substantial asset of the parties. She still owned the
home at the time of this proceeding and received net
$100.00 per month rental. (R.104).
AdditiOlllally, appellant has received an inheritance
of over $30,000.00 since the Divorce Decree was entered.
(R. 103).
Her circumstances have materially changed in regard
to certain expense·s that she no longer has. At the time
of the divo·rce the children were enrolled in a private
school in Salt Lake City, Utah, at an expense of appmximately $3,000.00 per year. The children are no longer
enrolled in private schools but are enrolled in the1 public
schools of California so this expense has been eliminated.
(R.158)
At the time of the divorce, appellam.t was spending
approximately $4,000.00 per year for psychiatric counseling and this expense has been eliminated. (R. 101).
When all of the above factors are considered as they
were by the Lower Court, it becomes abundantly clear
that in this case there is no further legal justification for
the alimony award.

If more were needed, the admission of the plaintiff
as to her needs amply corroborates the conclusion:
Q.

Now, as far as yon personally are concerned,
vou are able to support yourself, ad0quat0l~·,
~re vou not, on your salary?
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A.

Yes.

(R-107).

'l'he Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
entered by the Lower Court reduring alimony find ample
support in Law:
"The fact that a wife, who was unemployed when
a de-cree for alimony was entered, has since secured employment, or that her income at the time
of the decree has increased or decreased substantially, may justify a modification in the decree."
24 Am. Jr. 2d, Divorce and Separation,, Sec. 680.
The following Section (681) states:
"A substantial increase in the wife's separate
property or estate, as by gift or inheritance, which
results in an increased income, may justify reduction in alimony."
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE
SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN APPELLANT'S INCOME AS
A FACTOR COMPELLING THE REDUCTION OF ALIMONY.

The argurnem..t set forth by appellant under hN Point
III appears to say that regardless of the fact that a wife
after a divorce, obtains employment or increases her income, cannot be a basis for a reduction in alimony. Implicit in the statements of appellant is the further argument that 01nce two people have been married and a
divorce occurs, that the ·wife is forever after entitled to
extract alimony from the husband regardless of the
increase in the wife's earnings. The argument is not
supported by any Utah case and tlw annotation in 18
ALR 2d, Page 62, as quoted on Page 14 of appellant's
Brief is not within the context of the entire1 annotation.
Appropriate, however is a statement from the case annotated, which is Arnold 1 s. Arnold, 76 NE 2d 335 (Ill.).
The Illinois statute is similar to the Utah statute and
1

provides:
""\Vhen a divorce shall ht' decreed, the Court may
make sucih Order tonching thP alimony and maintenance of the wife or hnsband, the care, custody
amd support of the children, or any of them as,
from thP circumstance of the parties and the
nature of thP east', shall be fit, rPasoll'ahle and
just ... and the Court may, on .appl~ca.tion, from
timP to time, make sneh alterat10ns rn the allowance of alimonv and maimtenance, and the care,
custodv and support of thP ehildren, as shall he
reason'able and proper."
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The Court then quoted from an earlier Illinois case
as follows:
"The foundation of alimony beiing the obligation
of the husband to support his wife and the decree
being merely the enforcement of' that obligation
in behalf of a wife legally permitted to live apart
from her husband, our statute wisely recognizes
that a change in circumstances may require a
change in the decree. As a measure of the sum
required is necessarily the need of the wife and
the ability of the husband to pay, the amount
decreed will logically be ,affected by change m
eithl'r element." (Emphasis supplied.)
On Page 59 of ALR 2d, the following is stated:
"The fact that the wife was 1J1ot employed when the
decree for alimony or maintenance \\~as entered
but secured employment later is often an important consideration in determin:iing whether to reduce or terminate the payments."
The argument of appellant is further refuted by a
statement in Sorenson vs. Sore%son, 20 Ut. 2d 364, 438
Pac. 2d 180:
"Our statute permits subsequent changes which
are reasonable and proper. This ha:S been construed to empower the Court to make a modification where there has been a substantial chamge in
the material circumstances of either one, or both,
of the parties since the decree was entered."
'rhe argument made by appellant that her substantrial
increase in income was not a factor to be considered by
the Lower Court, is squarely defeated by the Sorenson
rase, when the Court states that the Lower Court may
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modify for substantial change of circumstances of ''either
one or both of the parties."
Again there were other factors before the Court for
consideration which are set forth i:n other parts of this
Brief. This Court should ref er part,icularly to paragraph
10 of the Findings of the LoweT Court:
"The uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff
was that her salary was entirely adequate for her
support without reliance upon the alimony paid
by defendwnt, and this fact iR 0orroborated by the
information shown on the Exhibits introdnced wlating to plaintiff's financial (~xpendihues." (R.
39).
The evidence supports the foregoing Finding of the
Court and appellant has not by her argument shown any
financial reason why that Finding should be disturbed.
Irndeed, it would be difficult for most of us to conclude
that a financial need exists where a person earns in excess of $26,000.00 a year.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN MODIFYING THE DECREE EVEN THOUGH BASED UPON STIPULATION.

The argument made under this Point is that if a
Divorce Decree is in part based upon a Stipulation of the
parties, it camnot thereafter be altered unless a showing
of hardship is made. Appellant cites as suppo,rt for the
proposition a statement from 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and
Reparation, Sec. 670. It is an accurate quotation but
taken out of context and not really germane to the issues
i n this case. The attention of the Court is invited to the
first part of the quoted Section where the correct and
general rule of law is stated:
1

"Although there is some authority to the contrary,
it is the almost universal rule that where a Court
has the general power to modify a decree for alimony, such power is not affected by the fact that
such a decree for alimonv refers to, or is based
upon or even incorporate~, an agreenwnt ente,red
into by the parties to the action."
The sentence quoted by appellant has been taken
from what appears to be an exception to the ge1J1eral rule
and is set forth later in the Section. The sentence refers
to a situation where alimo111y is an integral part of a
propPrty settlement agreement and not in fact, a provision for support. We have in mind a situation where
:-:uh:-:tantial assets of the parties are being divided and
the 1n·ovision for monthly alimony is a device to equalize
assets where, as an example, the famil~v business cannot
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be liquidated. In a situation such as that, the Court
would not have the power to modify ain alimony provision
because it would be an integral part of a contract settling
property rights. That is the type situation that the statement quoted by appellant appliPs. It has no application
in this case because the Stipulation entered into b~, the
parties was of the usual variety seen daily in our Courts
awarding certain property absolutely and providing for
future support.
The absolute finality contended for by appellant in
the award of alimony is 'not supported by the Decree of
Divorce. Paragraph 8 of the Decree (R. 23) states:
"Defendant shall pay to plaintiff as alimony thP
sum of $600.00 per month commencing May l, 19GS
and until further orde,r of the Court."
Where, as here, the Lower Court contemplated possible modification in the very la:nguage of the Decree, appellant cannot be heard to complain when the Court,
finding adequate ground for modification, exercises the
discretion clearly spelled out in the Decree.
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POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ELIMINATING FROM
THE DIVORCE DECREE THE PROVISION ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CLAIM THE THREE CHILDREN AS INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS.

The Divorce Decree (R. 23) provided iin part:
" ... provided that the defendant 'may claim the
children as exemptions on his State and Federal
income tax so long as payments are not delinquent."
After the Petition of respondent was heard by the
Lower Court and after the Court made and entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together
with an appropriate Order, the appellant on Jun.e 7, 1972,
filed with the Court a pleading entitled Objections to
Findings, Conclusions and Order. (R. 47-48). Contained
in the Objection is a statement by appellant that if the
Modification Order was to remain, then the provision
relating to income tax exemptions should be eliminated.
Without hearing any evidence concerniing the propriety of such an Order and merely upon the argument
of counsel, the Lower Court modified the Divorce Decree
by eliminating therefrom the provision allowing respondt'nt to claim the Federal and State income tax exemption
This Court will recall that at the time of the hearing
on modification, the Lower Court expressed concern
about the amount being paid by respondent as child
support. Respondent voluntarily accepted the increase
sngg0sted and ordered by the Lower Court to $125.00

29

per month per child, or a total of $375.00 per month child
support mo1ney. It was not until later when the Objections
to the Frndings were filed by respondent, that the Comt
eliminated the income tax feature. Had appellant raised
this issue at the time evidence was taken by the Lower
Court, respondent would have had an opportunity to present evidence showing the necessity that the income tax
feature of the Divorce Decree remain unchanged. At
the hearing thereon no evidence was taken. The argument made by appellamt for the elimination of the tax
feature of the Decree was that if thE> alimon~· was to be
reduced, then the question of who would get the exemptions should be left open. (R. 47-48).
Appellant further argued that the tax feature of the
Decree of Divorce was predicated on rt>spondent providing a certain level of family support. Reference to the
Divorce Decree entered b~· the Court (R. 22 through 24)
contains no implication that the tax feature of the Stipulation is subject to respondent paying at a certain income
level. It merely co1I1tains the usual provision that respondent could claim the tax exemption so long as he was
not delinquent in payments.
rrhere is simply no evidentiary basis for the Court's
ruling and the Record before this Court crunnot support it.
It is true that in matters of divorce the Trial Court
possessPs broad equitable powers to solve family prob·
lems but the exercise of thesP powers is dependent upon
a fadual record so that this Court will know whether the
decision of the LowN· Conrt was sonnd and in kerping
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with the needs of the parties. On the Record before this
Court on the issue it is impossible to tell why the Court
rnled as it did and whether sound discretion was exereised. For this reason alone the Lower Court should be
reversed on this Point. A further reason is the fact that
support money was increased from $200.00 a month to
$375.00 a mointh and the only inference to be drawn therefrom is that respondent is even more entitled to claim
the exemption.
There are practical considerations involved also. Sec.
152 ( e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code now
provides in substance that a parent not having custody
of a child may claim the exemption under the following
circumstances :

1.

If the parent pays at least $600.00 per year
for the support of the child and the Divorce
Decree or a written Agreement says that the
parent is entitled to the exemption, the Revenue Service will accept the claim even though
the contribution wasn't more than half of the
child's support.

2.

If the parent provides more than $1,200.00
for the support of the child, then he or she is
entitled to the exemption unless the parent
having custody provided a larger amoun~ for
support. In this case each parent is entitled
to an itemized accounting of expenditnres.

One of the functions of the Divorce Court is to reduce
eonflicts hetween embattled spouses. If the Order of the
Lower Court is to remain under this Point, it is easy
to forPsPe a eontinuing argum0nt between these two par-
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ties. It will result in an annual accounting· contest. That
is not desirable.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Lower Court modifying the Divorce
Decree in regard to the expanded visitation privileges
of respondeint and the reduction of alimony should be
affirmed. The Order of the Court eliminating respondent's right to claim the Federal and State income tax
exemption should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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